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# 1

## Introduction

Contemporary French foreign policy is a complex and fascinating subject – intimately associated with President Charles de Gaulle and his successors – of a defeated global power regaining self-respect, military power and diplomatic weight in world affairs after liberation from the national *désastre* of Nazi invasion and occupation from June 1940 to June 1944 (Grosser 1989). France is one of just a handful of EU states (together with Britain and perhaps Germany) with the diplomatic, economic and military wherewithal to play an appreciable role in world affairs without the “cover” of the EU. Yet French foreign policy is also closely linked with European construction, building European foreign policy and acting via Europe.

This book focuses on the interaction of French national policy with collective European foreign policy (EFP) in one area of the world – East Asia. The research question is salient in the light of France’s 1993 definition of Asia as the “new frontier” of French diplomacy, and the EU’s 1994 “New Asia Strategy”.<sup>1</sup> This book will examine the impact of EU membership and European institutions such as European Political Cooperation (EPC) and its successors the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on French policy. How have over 30 years of participation in EU foreign policy coordination structures and practices affected French policies in East Asia? Have they been constrained or enabled by the European Union in the 1990s, and how?

Since 1970 and the start of foreign policy coordination under EPC, France has been one of the long-term participants in European Foreign Policy. Most studies of the effect of the European Union on a Member State’s foreign policy have concentrated on the difference made to new (or sometimes potential) members. Studies such as those on Spain,

Portugal and Greece have highlighted the constraints and *acquis politiques* – such as the recognition of Israel by Spain in 1986 – that new Member States had to accept (Hill 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998). By contrast, it has been implicitly assumed that “old” Member States, such as France and the other five signatories to the 1957 Rome Treaties, have not had to make significant adjustments since they were present at the creation of the EC and could directly influence the evolution and direction of EU policies and institutions from the beginning.

### **National foreign policies vs European Foreign Policy (EFP)**

The notion of a “foreign policy” often carries with it the conceptual assumptions of the state-centred view of world politics. Although the international system is populated by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of foreign policy as essentially the *domaine réservé* of sovereign governments and therefore exclusive to states. One of the most comprehensive definitions of “foreign policy” in the international relations literature, by K.J. Holsti, characterizes foreign policy as “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in non-state actors, in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world”. The essence of foreign policy is often understood as the definition of national ends, objectives or interests, and the pursuit of these interests. Foreign policy is therefore seen as “an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state so as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives” (Holsti 1992:82; Allen 1998:43–44).

The main problem with using either notion of “foreign policy” is that the EU is *not* a unified state actor with identifiable “European interests”. Despite habits of policy consultation and coordination through EPC since 1970, the EU is still a “flexible and disaggregated series of patterns, arrangements and institutions which express a collective yet pluralistic identity, and of which others are increasingly aware” (Allen and Smith 1990:23). If we use a working definition of foreign policy as “actions and ideas designed by policy makers of an *international actor* (rather than state actor) to promote a change in the attitudes of other actors or in the environment”, we will be justified in characterizing the EU as a significant international actor which not only makes foreign policy, but also exerts a significant influence on world politics, whether in interactions with other states, regional or

international organizations from ASEAN to the UN, or international regimes like the WTO (Allen *et al* 1982; Devuyst 1995).

The foreign policy of an EU member state cannot be easily divorced from the complex European foreign policy-making mechanism centred in Brussels. *EU foreign policy* (EFP) is thus a much more encompassing concept than the narrow focus of intergovernmental politico-diplomatic activities under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established by the Maastricht Treaty and succeeded European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1993. As the EU is not a single unified actor, “EU foreign policy” (EFP) will be understood in this book as the sum and interaction of the “three strands” of Europe’s “external relations system”, comprising: (a) the national foreign policies of the Member States, (b) EC external trade relations, and (c) the CFSP (Hill 1993; Ginsberg 1999). National foreign policies have of course always existed side by side with, sometimes in competition to collective EC/EU policies, eg. on issues as diverse (and often divisive) as dealing with the US, Iraq and Iran, China, Russia, the Middle East, nuclear disarmament, UN reform and WTO negotiations. On the economic front, the record of Community policies (mainly economic and trade policies) has generally been a success while the record of politico-security policies under EPC/CFSP has been mixed. Whatever the record in each area, it is clearly perceived that “Europe” does act in various issue areas and that Europeans also act as individuals, groups and nations, actions sometimes interpreted by outsiders as representative of Europe as a whole (Hill 1998a).

The lack of a coherent “European” foreign policy has often been attributed to the absence of a centralized decision-making state-like executive. EFP decisions are often arrived at as compromises between national foreign policies of Member States. As such, European foreign policy as a subject of enquiry up till the mid-1990s tended to be either dismissed out of hand by realists as non-existent, or idealized teleologically as an inevitable end-product of European integration, quite divorced from the realities of persistent (and often divergent) national foreign policies. Within European foreign policy studies, one school sees Member States as the principal actors while another emphasizes the role of supranational institutions (eg. the Commission) and the emergence of a “European interest” – a kind of pan-European national interest. Neither school has developed good causal theories of EU foreign policy because they tend to be highly normative and to advocate positions on what the EU should be rather than what the EU is actually doing in world politics.

### **State-centric vs. European-idealist conceptions of EFP**

The study of the foreign policy of EU Member States is thus split into two rival camps. In one camp is the traditional approach, focusing on the foreign policy of individual Member States as utility-maximizing, selfish and purposive actors – let us call this the “state-centric” school. The “hard” position in this tradition claims that states are the only essential and salient actors. Any study of EU foreign policy is thus unproductive as the “real” Europe is the one of state governments. As Hedley Bull claimed, “‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull 1983). Bull felt that only an independent European nuclear deterrent and military power (represented by a West European military alliance led by France and Britain) would give Europe a real capability in foreign affairs. Of course, Bull’s assessment was coloured by the escalating Cold War tensions of the 1980s between the USSR and Reagan’s USA, but his prognosis for a European military capability independent of the US and NATO is still shared by many states and analysts today (chiefly in some quarters of France and Britain) in the aftermath of armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and Iraq in 2003.

Not all scholars in the state-centric tradition dismiss the EU as a serious international actor because of its lack of state-like qualities, nor do they agree with Bull’s military-security conclusion. Neorealist intergovernmentalists privilege the centrality of the state while acknowledging the EU’s influence, albeit only as a forum in which governments meet periodically to negotiate new contracts that enhance their interests and power. They view the EU as merely representing an advanced forum for negotiations at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). The “Harvard approach” of liberal intergovernmentalism, represented by Andrew Moravcsik, believes that the Member States can raise the common interest in EU policy-making. It has a materialist and rationalist bias in its stress on “interstate bargain”, deals and side-payments between Member States’ governments who at certain times come to common agreements when their preferences converge. In this conception, decisions at the European level are viewed as “conventional statecraft” between sovereign states – the key actors in all EU activities (Moravcsik 1991).

In the other camp – which I will call “European-idealist”<sup>2</sup> – is the perspective which treats European Foreign Policy as a given, that is, as a foreign policy that already exists, has a consistent personality that makes an impact on world politics, and is taken seriously by other actors (H. Smith 2002; White 2001; Nuttall 2000; Zielonka 1998a; Carlsnaes

and Smith 1994). While this approach does not deny the continued importance of individual Member States' foreign policies and accepts that EFP will not supplant national foreign policies any time soon – especially in defence and security matters – it often presumes that EFP's scope will expand eventually to subsume national policies in almost all other functional areas (M.E. Smith 2000). Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith in 1994 made the bold prediction that the essentially “multilayered character” of the new Europe would mean that “differentiated as to function, and maybe implicitly acknowledging suzerainty-like hierarchies, they will develop kinds of diplomatic relations and foreign policies that we best anticipate by reading about ‘proto diplomacy’ in Der Derian's *On Diplomacy* (1987) and by searching even further away in time and space – among the empires of antiquity, the Chinese and Indian diplomatic traditions...” (Carlsnaes and Smith 1994:271).

The European-idealist perspective downplays the realist emphasis on state power and national interests, and privileges instead the role of supranational European institutions in building a common “European” identity, and a distinctive moral presence in world politics. François Duchêne, the first major spokesman in this school, envisaged the EU as a “civilian power”, a kind of “soft power” which wields civilian instruments on behalf of a collectivity which has renounced the use of force among its members and encourages others to do likewise (Duchêne 1973). Taking as their starting point Duchêne's premise that the EU should and can become a “civilian power” and a model of reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world, European-idealists posit that EU foreign policy should focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and security cooperation. Many have advocated the German model of using economic leverage focusing on issues such as environmental concerns and open trading rather than military power as the way forward for the EU after the Cold War. Karen Smith lists propaganda, diplomacy and economic instruments as three of the four instruments (excluding military) that the EU could and should exploit as a civilian power (K. Smith 1998). Acknowledging that the European Union may never possess a common defence policy, others have suggested that the EU has unparalleled foreign policy strengths as an “attractive power” at the pivotal point between overlapping international clubs (Rosecrance 1998).

Attempts since the early 1980s to bridge this divide have focused almost entirely on comparing individual Member States' foreign policies, albeit *within* the framework of the EPC/CFSP (Hill 1983, 1996;



Manners and Whitman 2000; Tonra 2001). Scholarship along this vein argues that there is something “distinctive” about the foreign policies of EU Member States. These states’ foreign policies are made under opportunities and constraints qualitatively different from that of the US, hence a distinctive foreign policy analysis method to study EU Member States’ foreign policies is necessary (Manners and Whitman 2000; Carlsnaes and Smith 1994). It clearly matters if a state is a member of the EU or not; relations between a non-Member State and the EU (and its Member States) on issues such as trade and the Common Agricultural Policy, can pass overnight from being “foreign” to domestic policy.

Instead of getting bogged down in the debate of whether foreign policy can really exist for the EU as a non-state actor, and how to identify and evaluate a debatable “policy”, it may be more fruitful to conceptualise EFP in terms of a *process*, and of the EU’s actorness, presence and impact in international affairs (going back to Holsti’s definition of ideas or actions aimed at making changes in the environment). Thus the EU is an actor on issues ranging from the UN Human Rights charter and the NPT, to China’s WTO membership, NATO expansion, and the plight of refugees fleeing wars in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, or indeed the Balkans. The EU is present and active both as an actor in itself and through its Member States at both bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations on these issues.

### **Foreign policy analysis and Europeanization theory**

“Europeanization” is a relatively new, fashionable and ill-defined concept in the scholarly literature of European Studies/International Relations (Wong 2005; Olsen 2002, 2003). Like globalization theory, there is much debate over the nature, causes and effects of Europeanization, and precious little agreement on what exactly Europeanization *is* (Harmsen and Wilson 2000). The term often refers to the political and policy *changes* caused by the impact of membership in the European Union on the Member States. Europeanization theorists draw on ideas found in institutionalism as well as in rationalization and globalization theories. Some see Europeanization as an “institutionally thick form of rationalisation within the global economy” (Rosamond 2000a:179–180). Borrowing from institutionalist theory’s hypothesis that international institutions have “persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989:161), various Europeanization scholars argue that sustained membership and participation in the EU leads to

Table 1.1 Three Schools of Thought on Europeanization

Schools of Thought on Europeanization	Direction of Change/ Related Processes	Major Proponents
National Adaptation (A)	Top-down/Globalization, policy convergence	Ladrech (1994), Kassim <i>et al</i> (2000, 2003), Lequesne (1993), Goetz and Hix (2001), Tonra (2000), Manners and Whitman (2000)
National Projection (B)	Bottom-up and sideways/ Policy projection, Policy learning, Policy transfer	Milward (1992, 2000) Bulmer and Burch (1999) Moravcsik (1993, 1998), Guyomarch <i>et al</i> (1998), Laffan and Stubb (2003)
Identity Reconstruction (C)	Top-down/Elite socialization	M.E. Smith (2000), Hill and Wallace (1996), Nuttall (1992, 2000), Øhrgaard (1997), Zielonka (1998a), de Schoutheete (1986)

the convergence of national policy-making, both in style and content (Cole and Drake 2000; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Ladrech 1994). Harmsen and Wilson identify as many as eight distinct, if partially overlapping, senses of the term “Europeanization” in current usage (Harmsen and Wilson 2000:13–18). For the purpose of studying the impact of the EU on Member States’ foreign policies, I would highlight three groups of the varied meanings of the concept “Europeanization” as most relevant and potentially useful (Table 1.1).

One school of “Europeanization” in foreign policy sees the process as equivalent to “*national adaptation*” (*School A*). This school argues that over time, there is a dilution of the national in favour of the European. Ben Tonra defines Europeanization in foreign policy as “...a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making” (Tonra 2000:229). This “transformation” usually translates as adaptation to EU norms and standards, an “incremental process orienting Member States’ politics and policies towards the EU”. One of the oldest and most widely received conceptions of Europeanization is by

Robert Ladrech, who defines Europeanization in terms of national adaptation to EU membership where "...EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech 1994:69).

Here Europeanization is a top-down process in which the state is reactive, and where the state adapts and makes adjustments in its domestic politics and policy in compliance with the constraints and requirements of European institutions. Christian Lequesne's detailed study of the iterative process of French EU policy-making and the interaction between Paris and Brussels also makes an argument for the national (in this case, French government's) reorientation of domestic politics and structures. Focusing on the institutions of the EU and joint policy-making in the EU framework between Brussels and the national capitals, Lequesne and others have used the lenses of Comparative Politics in suggesting an incremental "iterative process" of Europeanization in the national administrations as governments adapt their mechanisms and practices of policy-making in politics, administration and law. Incrementalism and "muddling through" are the main processes in this model of Europeanization. Adaptations are *ad hoc* and there is no thought-out, coherent plan. Moreover, the extent and nature of the EU influence depends on endogenous factors in the member-states which affect their capacity to adapt. National institutions may clash with, or conform to, European integration; in particular, their capacity to accommodate, refract or resist pressures for change are key to understanding distinct national and sectoral trajectories of Europeanization (Lequesne 1993; Goetz and Hix 2001; Kassim 2000, 2003; Guyomarch 2001; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998:188). Manners and Whitman conclude that "Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policy objectives inside an EU context" (Manners and Whitman 2000:243). If this generalization is true, then the foreign policies of EU states must, with the cumulative weight of the *acquis* of EPC/CFSP/CESDP – to name but one of the three arenas of each Member State's participation in EFP – increasingly show some discernible impact on the foreign policies of these states. I would argue that the logical extension of the Manners and Whitman thesis is foreign policy *convergence* (both in substance and in process) over the long term, although the process may suffer periodic setbacks and reversals.

A bottom-up understanding of Europeanization (*School B*) is also common currency. In this conception, which I will call the "*national projection*" school, nation-states are the primary actors and agents of

change rather than passive subjects. Alan Milward argues that the early construction of the EU was achieved by, and contributed towards, the post-war construction of European nation-states. European integration was viewed as a means and vehicle for the achievement of nationally defined goals. For Bulmer and Burch, Europeanization is a process of “seeking to export domestic policy models, ideas and details to the EU”. In the place of a reactive state being constrained to change its policy-making processes, this school sees the state as being pro-active in *projecting* its preferences, policy ideas and models to the European Union. This conception of Europeanization shares many similarities with rational-choice, interest-based accounts of national preferences and national élites using the EU as an instrument to further national interests (Milward 1992, 2000; Bulmer and Burch 1999; Guyomarch *et al* 1998, Laffan and Stubb 2003).

The “national projection” school of Europeanization at first glance provides a countervailing antithesis to the national adaptation/policy convergence school. The latter fails to appreciate the roles played by Member States themselves – especially the larger and more powerful ones, in *shaping* EU structures and policies. These states, in “projecting” their national policies and policy styles onto the larger European structure, “Europeanize” their previously national priorities and strategies and create a dialectical relationship. By exporting their preferences and models onto EU institutions, they in effect generalize previously national policies onto a larger European stage. This has several benefits. First, the state increases its international influence. Second, the state potentially reduces the risks and costs of pursuing a controversial or negative policy (eg sanctions) against an extra-European power. As some scholars have noted, even small states within the European Union may pursue integration as a way of “formalizing, regulating and perhaps limiting the consequences of interdependence.” (Milward 2000:19). In the same vein, scholars have argued that Germany “Europeanized” its low-deficit, fiscally disciplined macro-economic policies into the EMU convergence criteria, that the UK Europeanized its sanctions on Argentina during the Falklands conflict in 1982, and that France projected its institutions into the early EC and its predecessor, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (Regelsberger *et al* 1997). These examples also suggest that foreign policy-making is as susceptible to Europeanization as domestic policy, politics and processes, that is, foreign policy is *not* a special case immune to Europeanization pressures on Member States.

Sociological or constructivist Europeanization theories (*School C*) privilege the role played by European institutions in changing the interests, politics and policy-making of Member States over time into a more convergent whole. This school shares insights and assumptions with sociological institutionalism, which suggests that the EU's common policies, or *acquis politiques*, have encouraged new conceptions of interest and identity among its Member States. Sociological institutionalists believe that institutions play more than a cost-minimizing, information and utility-maximizing coordinating role in ensuring reciprocal cooperation for the collective good. The "sociological institutions" in EFP are found in the form of *unwritten* rules, norms and practices, found in both Pillar I and CFSP, and include the "Gymnich formula" (foreign ministers' informal retreat held every six months or so by each Presidency), and the premium placed on consultation and consensus. Sociological studies from the late 1990s indicate that EPC/CFSP institutions have a strong "socialization" effect; élites involved even in the inter-governmental bargaining process of EPC/CFSP show surprising signs of internalizing supranational norms and interests, feeding these back to their national capitals (Øhrgaard 1997; M.E. Smith 2000; Bellier in Harmsen and Wilson 2000:147–150). In their study of the impact of the EU on Irish officials, Laffan and Tannam note that "public officials are no longer just agents of the Irish state; they are participants in an evolving polity which provides opportunities for political action but also imposes constraints on their freedom of action" (Hanf and Soetendorp 1998:69; Tonra 2001). Research in this school suggests convergence as "prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU Member States and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines." The main agents for convergence include élite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalized "imperative of concertation" (M.E. Smith 2000; Glarbo 1999:650).

### **Approaches to understanding French foreign policy**

The dominant academic approach to French policy is to explain it as a medium power with Gaullist great-power ambitions, reflexes and clear foreign policy goals of security and independence (Doise and Vaïsse 1992; Bozo 1998; Gordon 1993; Grosser 1989). These works, together with institutional analyses explain French foreign policy as the product of a rational, state with a clear sense of its "national interests" (Kessler 1999). Recent empirical studies on European foreign policies (both collective and those of individual European member states) in East Asia

have largely approached the subject matter from a national foreign policy perspective. Does participation in EU foreign policy make a difference to the foreign policy of EU Member States? No, according to the dominant view, exemplified by Stanley Hoffmann. Foreign policies are the domain of sovereign states and the EU can never have a foreign policy, properly speaking, as it is made up of a collection of states (Hoffmann 1966; Bull 1983). As such, individual states within the EU can at best be constrained by EU structures (cf. regime theory), but will never allow these structures to set their policy. The “Gaullist” approach posits that member states such as France (and the UK) with a strong attachment to an independent foreign policy will resist pressures to conform to European institutions.

As the “Gaullist” approach is increasingly inadequate in explaining the actions and policies of France, even in its *domaines réservés* (traditional colonial spheres of influence), other works emphasize the input and impact of EU foreign policy-making mechanisms. According to this second view, French foreign policy-making has been fundamentally altered by Europe. There is a coordination reflex among EU foreign policy-making élites, and this is set to increase over time with the further institutionalization of foreign policy coordination with CFSP since 1992 and ESDP since 1998 (La Serre 1996; Lequesne 1993; Blunden 2000; Øhrgaard 1997).

A third approach is to ignore the member states’ foreign policies altogether and to study the role of the EU in different regions of the world. This approach assumes that Member States’ foreign policy interests are increasingly subsumed by and expressed through the EU (H. Smith 2002; Piening 1997; Regelsberger *et al* 1997). Hazel Smith, for example, argues that the EU has been a significant unmistakable actor in international relations for several decades and is recognized by other actors as such. European Foreign Policy is thus its own animal, distinct from and far from being merely a summation of individual Member States’ foreign policies through a complex system of intergovernmental negotiation (Nuttall 2000).

### **Applying Europeanization theory to French foreign policy**

To answer the question of how much French foreign policy has been affected by the EU, this book proposes three concepts of Europeanization applicable to national foreign policy. As a top-down process, Europeanization is the process of policy convergence caused by participation over time in foreign policy-making at the European level. This

produces shared norms and rules that are gradually accumulated (Sjursen 2001:199–200, Øhrgaard 1997). As a bottom-up process, it is the projection of national preferences, ideas and policy models into Europe. A third aspect is the redefinition of national interests and identity in the context of “Europe”. Europeanization is thus a bi-directional process that leads to a negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supra-national levels (M.E. Smith 2000).

When there is convergence between Member States and EU institutions, this could result in a raising of the common interest, for example, encouraging the development and consolidation of democracy and human rights abroad by only trading and having full political/diplomatic relations with governments that respect minimum human rights standards. At other times, it is the lowest common denominator decision/preference that prevails and becomes EU policy. This could be the case in legitimizing one Member State’s interests by raising EU protectionist barriers against other trading countries/groups of states.

Is foreign policy immune to Europeanization (if we understand the process as policy convergence)? Stanley Hoffmann, observing the reassertion of nationalist sentiment in the EC/EU by France under de Gaulle in the 1960s and Chirac from 1995, made the realist claim that states remained the basic units in world politics (Hoffmann 1966, 2000) and that France today remains fiercely jealous and protective of its foreign policy independence. Intergovernmentalists like Hoffmann privilege the role of national governments in defining their national interests independently of the EU, and then bringing these interests to the table for negotiation. Andrew Moravcsik, the chief scholar arguing for liberal intergovernmentalists, argues that “the primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik 1991:75). The key actors are governmental élites and the motivation for integration is the preservation of executive capacity at the national level, *not* its erosion (Moravcsik 1993:515):

The EC provides information to governments that is not generally available...National leaders undermine potential opposition by reaching bargains in Brussels first and presenting domestic groups with an “up or down” choice...Greater domestic agenda-setting power in the hands of national political leaders increases the ability of governments to reach agreements by strengthening the ability of governments to gain domestic ratification for compromises or tactical issue linkages.

Control by the Council and/or the Commission represent “two cultures” competing in the European foreign policy-making process. The EPC had been devised essentially along the lines of the Gaullist Fouchet Plan, to prevent Brussels from becoming a foreign policy centre and to keep foreign policy as a *national* competence within the Council. Even so, the “Brusselsization” (steady enhancement of Brussels based decision-making bodies) of foreign policy shows no sign of abating, and even Member States jealous of their foreign policy sovereignty have not been immune to this process (Allen 1998, Peterson and Sjursen 1998, White 2001).

How far does the Europeanization perspective explain Member States’ recent foreign policy? We are thus faced with a dichotomy. The Europeanization perspective portrays the Member State subject to the strains, constraints, opportunities and influences of EU membership as a “member of the club” and obliged to behave and play a certain role in the EFP regime. In contrast, the intergovernmental perspective (with its realist and liberal variants) views the Member State as an independent power driven by its national interests, a state that shapes, influences and sets the pace of European foreign policy,

*Table 1.2* Europeanization versus Intergovernmentalism in the study of National Foreign Policy

	Europeanization Theory	Intergovernmentalism	
		– Realist variant	– Liberal variant
<b>Central Variables</b>	Knowledge/learning/ roles	Power	Domestic Interests
<b>Role of Institutions</b>	Strong to medium	Weak	Weak
<b>Meta-Theoretical Orientation</b>	Sociological (Sch.C, A) Rationalistic (Sch.B)	Rationalistic	Rationalistic
<b>Behavioural Model</b>	Role-player	Concerned with relative gains	Concerned with absolute gains
<b>Main Actors</b>	European élites, Member States (Sch.B), institutions, IOs, interest groups	State	Government elites, domestic interests
<b>Actors’ Preferences</b>	Socialized and negotiated (A, C)	Exogenously given and fixed	Dynamic, rising from processes in national polities



and determines its level of cooperation according to its interests in the issue at hand. The two paradigms and their major characteristics are summarized in Table 1.2.

Of course, the table above exaggerates the differences between the two perspectives. The supranational-intergovernmental divide has narrowed considerably today as Member States adjust to the increasing Brusselsization of foreign policy-making. Britain and France, the two most “independent” Member States in the EU, increasingly accept that they can no longer assure their own national defence nor pursue an independent global role today. Even Britain, the Member State traditionally most opposed to European supranational integration and in favour of intergovernmental decision-making in the EU, shows characteristics of moving towards foreign policy decision-making at the European level (White 2001).

Under the CFSP “Europeanization” can be understood as a process of foreign policy convergence. It is a *dependent* variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors (EU institutions, statesmen, etc) in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen). Europeanization is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as policy *convergence* (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection). Identity reconstruction (towards a “European” identity) is a closely related effect observable over time.

For scholars such as Ladrech and Kassim, Europeanization is national adaptation to pressures arising from European integration. For Harmsen and Wilson, it is an *effect* on national institutions, identities and citizenship. The primary usage of the Europeanization concept – that of capturing the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU – is of course critical in testing if national policy-making has indeed been affected by EU membership, and in what ways. Europeanization scholars may debate the institutional forms and distinctive national responses to EU pressures. Some may note that Europeanization as adaptation has actually increased divergence within the EU (Mazey and Richardson 1996). Over the longer term however, a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation would necessarily result in cross-national policy convergence between EU states. Convergence in policy style and content is expected as EU institutions prescribe roles and constrain activities. Coupled with the second and third processes of national projection and identity reconstruction, the overall picture expected is one of converging rather than diverging policy outputs, whatever the differences between national structures, preferences and policy inputs.

The second process, that of the projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level, can be expected of states which command larger resources, strong domestic pressures or dogged commitment to change or forge a certain EU policy. National preferences are expected to be projected onto the European structure by the more powerful Member States which seek to structure EU institutions and policies according to their interests. This was the case of CAP for France and industrial competition for Germany.

Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense of identity and interest convergence – so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to take root – does not mean that the European will simply supplant the national over time. National identities and interests in Europe have evolved and grown over centuries and will not go away after just a few decades of European integration. However, European identity shapes and is increasingly incorporated into national identities.

The first concept of Europeanization is used predominantly in the literature to explain the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU. This concept predicts cross-national policy convergence between EU states after a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation. The second Europeanization concept refers to the bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level. Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity and interest convergence so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape them. The three aspects of Europeanization and their expected indicators (summarized in Table 1.3) will be used as a guide in the three country studies in Chapters 3–5.

We could measure the degree to which French foreign policy has been Europeanized over time by taking snapshots of the positions taken by France and other major EU actors (for example, the Commission and Parliament) and plotting them against the positions taken by comparable Member States (for example, Germany and Britain), at each turn asking the following questions under the three criteria:

- i) National adaptation/policy convergence
  - Has convergence and/or adaptation of national policy with EU norms and directives taken place?
  - Is convergence in substantive policy areas visible in the “direct” Europeanization of public policy where regulatory competence has passed from national capitals to Brussels, or the “indirect”

Table 1.3 Three Dimensions of Europeanization in National Foreign Policy

Aspects of Europeanization	National Foreign Policy Indicators
I Adaptation and Policy Convergence	a) Increasing salience of European political agenda b) Adherence to common objectives c) Common Policy outputs taking priority over national <i>domaines réservés</i>
II National Projection	a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other Member States c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella
III Identity Reconstruction	a) Emergence of norms among policy-making élites b) Shared definitions of European and national interests

Europeanization where Member States learn from one another through transnational cooperation and policy transfer?

- Have national institutional structures and policy-making processes been adapted in response to European integration?
- ii) Projection of national policy onto EU structures (“national projection”)
  - Has the state pushed for its national foreign policy goals to be adopted as EU goals/policy?
  - Has the state benefited from the “cover” of the EU?
  - How indispensable is the EU to the achievement of national foreign policy goals?
- iii) Internalization of “Europe” in national identities (“identity reconstruction”)
  - Has there been a reshaping or hybridization of identities which relativizes national identities and privileges a European identity?
  - What kinds of European norms have arisen among national officials and how do they apply to foreign policy?

#### “Europeanization”: dependent or independent variable?

If Europeanization is a *dependent* variable or *effect*, what is/are the independent variables driving the process? I would argue that we would have to cast the net for explanatory variables farther than the current Europeanization literature in Comparative Politics/Public Policy, and

deeper into time for an answer. Europeanization is ultimately driven by European integration, which itself can be traced to the underlying political and economic imperatives for highly coordinated cooperation between Member States that early integration theorists identified (Haas 1958).

Unlike Intergovernmentalism, Europeanization theory acknowledges the important roles played by non-state actors and Europeanized élites in formulating national foreign policy. But contrary to integration theory, Europeanization theory does not foresee a supranational centre eclipsing the national capitals. The Europeanization process is just one – albeit a significant one – among many effects in the domestic politics, processes and foreign policies of EU Member States. Furthermore, variables at the global, European, national and sub-national levels interact in intricate ways, so that to claim pressures from European integration as *the* deterministic or dominant causal variable, would be overstating the case.

The key proposition of Europeanization is that membership in the European Union has an important impact on each Member State's foreign policy and that this impact is increasing in salience. States that join the European Union have to and do adapt to pressures for changes in their foreign policies – frequently even *before* formal membership. The overlapping and inter-related forces of Europeanization (policy convergence, national projection and identity reconstruction) interact with often surprising results. The ensuing foreign policy of each Member State is the end product of a complex series of negotiations between governments, EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament), officials and Member State representatives, as well as a process of policy learning and emulation between individual Member States.

## Sources

Existing analyses do not systematically test how the European dimension has or might have shaped France's *national* foreign policy. As little in-depth research has been done on French policy in Asia in the period under study,<sup>3</sup> much of the empirical material contained in this book is based on primary sources found in French newspaper archives, political memoirs and policy speeches by French and other EU personalities on Asia. Many French positions and intra-EU politics on the making of its Asia policy are potentially sensitive and hence unpublished. Consequently, interviews with French officials, academics, foreign diplomats

and other actors based in Paris, Brussels, Singapore and Vietnam were necessary. Where anonymity was requested, the organizational affiliation rather than the person has been identified in the text. Most official EU (Commission and EP, but not GAC) documents are disseminated and freely available on the EU's website. Official French positions expressed in documents and speeches – chiefly from the President's office (Elysée), National Assembly, Senate, Prime Minister's Office (Matignon) and Foreign Ministry (Quai d'Orsay) – are available on the Quai d'Orsay website. Also invaluable were news reports and analyses in the national news dailies *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, and articles in the journals *Politique Etrangère*, *Politique Internationale*, *Notes et Études*, and *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*.

### **Plan of the book**

Chapter 2 sets out the context in which French and EU policy operate. It addresses the two key questions raised at the beginning of this chapter (page 1) by identifying and pinning down French foreign policy goals and objectives from those of the EU in East Asia. This chapter provides a background overview of French and European interests in East Asia after French decolonization in the 1950s, with a focus on the motivations and objectives around and since 1989 (Berlin Wall and Tiananmen) and 1991 (Maastricht and CFSP). The first section looks at French objectives in three domains: economic, politico-security and human rights interests, through the lens of national (French) foreign policy. The second section looks at these same domains but through the lens of the EU (chiefly the Commission, the Council and the Parliament). This chapter contends that national and collective EU foreign policies in East Asia are intimately related in a dialectical process of continuous, iterative adjustment and cannot be neatly differentiated. Increasingly, the definition of "interests" takes place as much in Brussels and in other EU capitals, as in Paris. An understanding of the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of Europeanization is thus necessary to make sense of the evolution in French policy in the region.

Chapter 3 shows how the French conception of the national interest *vis-à-vis* China *evolved* between the presidencies of Mitterrand and Chirac. It argues that a change in *perception* is a more satisfactory explanation for the French policy change towards China and Asia in the 1990s, as compared to the mainstream account of France pursuing national over community interests in order to increase its economic presence in China. We see France moving towards EU norms and

standards of behaviour in its political relations with China. Gaullist-style rhetoric on French grandeur and a special relationship with China still figured prominently. However, the discourse was broadened to stress China and *Europe* as great powers with common interests and goals. In trade and investment relations, it is the “German model” emphasizing economic interests which is emulated by France and then institutionalized as EU policy. French trade policy towards China was Europeanized in terms of policy learning and emulative transfer from another EU member state.

Chapter 4 argues that Paris’ conflictual relations with Tokyo up to 1991 were mediated by the EU, first as a “cover” for French economic protectionism, then as a source of top-down pressure for policy change towards Japan. As a key member of the G7, OECD and IMF, and observer in security fora like the OSCE, Japan is often regarded and treated more as a member of the “West” rather than an Asian state. Influenced by Europeanization pressures from the Commission and other EU member states, France changed its hostile policy towards Japan and converged its actions with the EU mainstream in viewing Japan as a valuable partner with similar “civilian power” capabilities and goals, for example, economic diplomacy via trade and aid, promoting liberal democracy and human rights (albeit differing on the priority of economic or political rights), and balancing relations with the US and other great powers (such as Russia and China).

Chapter 5 delves into the supposed special relationship between France and Vietnam. This serves as a counter-factual test case to Asian countries – such as China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Myanmar and the Koreas – which are targeted by the Commission or Council for clear and declared policy objectives and even comprehensive EU strategies. France is expected as a former colonial power to keep its privileged relations with Vietnam out of the EU policy process. Indeed, it managed to build a kind of special relationship with Hanoi in the decade between 1979 and 1989 when newly reunified Vietnam was an ostracized state. But even in what might be expected to be a French *domaine réservé*, Paris in the 1990s increasingly framed its expectations, objectives and policies towards Vietnam within the context the EU (though playing the role of EU initiator).

### **The argument**

France in many ways prefers an EU with weak institutions. However, French foreign policy after de Gaulle has clearly become less nationalist and more “European”. This development is partially explained by

constructivist accounts of the impact of EU norms and values and the internalization of community interests among foreign policy élites. French policy discourse today is replete with the ideas of collective EU objectives and common actions. A notion of shared European goals increasingly informs and shapes preferences, as well as the discourse on “national interests” emanating from Paris. At the annual Conference of French Ambassadors in 1994, then-Foreign Minister Alan Juppé made a clear pitch for Europeanising French foreign policy:

It is necessary that all our embassies in non-EU countries take European policy into account. The external action of the Union is sometimes perceived as offending our national policy or competing with it....This is an erroneous impression, at best a reaction which should be corrected. It is your role, as ambassadors of France, both to assert the identity of the European Union and to explain the specific positions defended by France within the institutions thereof. It is without reservations therefore, that you will endeavour, wherever you are, to affirm the political identity of the Union.<sup>4</sup>

The *structure* of French foreign policy-making is thus significant. The preferred and most important structure is obviously the EU. Evidently, the French are not abandoning national foreign policy autonomy altogether; but they are defending and promoting French interests *within* the institutions of the EU. French foreign policies are increasingly being defined in the *context* of EU foreign policy structures where French interests meet with those of other member states’ and collective positions have to be negotiated. Even in security policy, that other bastion of Gaullist sovereignty, Paris’ co-leadership with London since the end of 1998 towards a joint European defence capability is symptomatic of an increasing French willingness to pool resources in collective EU initiatives, even in sensitive areas impinging on national sovereignty (Hoffmann 2000:189–198).

A second theme running through this book is that French élites are redefining their interests according to accepted collective EU norms, goals and shared principles. Recent neo-functional and constructivist contributions to the study of EFP seem to suggest that policy convergence is deepening. These approaches argue that “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines.” The main agents for convergence include élite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalized “imperative of concertation.” (M.E. Smith 2000:614; Glarbo 1999:650).

This author recognizes that French elites often prefer to work outside of EU structures in East Asia and that French resources may still be sufficient to underpin coherent national policies towards individual countries (especially those in which France has strong historical ties, as in Indochina). I argue however that national resources are increasingly inadequate for a consistent, comprehensive policy towards whole geographic regions. Indeed, French capabilities are increasingly inadequate even to meet national objectives in large countries such as China and Japan.

While EU institutions as independent variables on national foreign policy behaviour are not critical on every issue, they are often significant and need to be studied in order the better to appreciate the motivations and formulation of French national foreign policy. That such changes have occurred at all in the foreign policy of a state traditionally “verbally favourable to a CFSP and politically ambivalent, because of a strong attachment to an independent security and above all foreign policy” (Hoffmann 2000:193), indicates the power of institutions and the unintended effects of French participation in EFP. Studies on the participation of other member states in EFP may well show more evidence of the creeping influence of EU membership on other national foreign policies.<sup>5</sup> An understanding of at least the top-down and bottom-up dimensions of Europeanization, and possibly also those of changing identities, is thus necessary to make sense of the evolution in French policy in East Asia since foreign policy cooperation between the member states was farther institutionalized in the 1990s.



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